Paradoxes are interesting puzzles in philosophy and mathematics, and they can be even more fascinating when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Liar's paradox can be translated into a propositional tautology, and Barber's paradox into a first-order tautology. Russell's paradox, which collapsed Frege's foundations for mathematics, is now a classical theorem in set theory, implying that no set of all sets can exist. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems; Liar's paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski's theorem which states the undefinability of truth in sufficiently rich languages. This paradox (and also Richard's paradox) appears implicitly in Gödel's proof of his celebrated first incompleteness theorem. In this paper, we study Yablo's paradox from the viewpoint of first and second order logics. We prove that a formalization of Yablo's paradox (which is second-order in nature) is non-first-order-izable in the sense of Boolos.
Introduction and Preliminaries
If mathematicians and philosophers have come to the conclusion that some (if not almost all) of the paradoxes cannot be (re)solved, or as Priest [10, p. 160] puts it "the programme of solving the paradoxes is doomed to failure", they have learned to live (and also get along) with the paradoxes; of course, as long as the paradoxes do not crumble the foundations of our logical systems. Paradoxes have proved to be more than puzzles or destructive contradictions; indeed they have been used in proofs of some fundamental * This research was partially supported by a grant from IPM (No. 95030033). mathematico-logical theorems. Let us take the most well-known, and perhaps the oldest, paradox: Liar's paradox. When translated into the language of logic, this paradox claims the existence of a sentence λ such that λ ↔ ¬λ holds. Now, Liar's paradox turns into a propositional tautology: ¬(p ↔ ¬p). In fact, when trying to convince oneself or someone else about the truth of ¬(p ↔ ¬p), one can see that the supposed argument is not very different from the argument of Liar's paradox. One can clearly see that the paradox becomes a (semantic) proof for that tautology; hence, the title of this article (which uses the above mentioned epigram of Shakespeare).
Let us take a second example; Russell's paradox. If there existed a set R such that ∀x(x ∈ R ↔ x ∈ x), then we would have a contradiction (the sentence R ∈ R ↔ R ∈ R which results from substituting x with R). So, the sentence ¬∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ x) is a theorem in the theory of sets, whose proof is nothing more than the argument of Russell's paradox. Going deeper into the proof (or the paradox) one can see that no real set-theoretic properties of the membership relation (∈) is used. That is to say that for an arbitrary binary relation S, the sentence ¬∃y∀x[S(y, x) ↔ ¬S(x, x)] is a first-order logical tautology (see [5, Exercise 12, p. 76] ). Now, if we interpret the predicate S(y, x) as "y shaves x", then we get Barber's paradox (due to Russell again). More generally, for any formula ϕ(x, y) with the only free variables x and y, the sentence ¬∃y∀x[ϕ(x, y) ↔ ¬ϕ(x, x)] is a first-order logical tautology, whose semantic proof is very similar to the argument of Russell's or Barber's paradox. In a similar way, the sentence ¬∃X (2) ∃y∀x[X (2) 
is a second-order tautology.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in Yablo's paradox; several papers (that we do not list them here) and one book [4] have been written on different aspects of this paradox. Yablo's paradox says that if there existed a sequence of sentences {Y n } n∈N with the property that for all n ∈ N : Y n ⇐⇒ ∀k > n (Y k is untrue), then we would have a contradiction, since none of those sentences can have a truth value (the sentences Y n would be neither true nor false). This paradox is humbly called by Yablo himself, the ω-Liar paradox. For formalizing Yablo's paradox in a (first-order or second-order) language, we abstract away even the order relation (<), that appears in the paradox, by replacing it with an arbitrary binary relation symbol R. Let us take Y 1 to be the first-
is an arbitrary first-order formula with the only free variable x. Here, the sentences Y n are represented by ϕ(n), and the quantifiers of the form ∀k > n · · · are represented by ∀k[kRn → · · · ]. DEFINITION 1.1 (Y 2 : Yablo's Paradox in Second Order Logic) Let Y 2 be the following second-order sentence:
where R is a fixed binary relation symbol. ✧ Some necessary conditions for refuting (Y 1 and) Y 2 are (A 1 ): ∀x∃y(xRy), and
That is to say that (the sentence A 1 ∧ A 2 → ¬Y 1 is a first-order tautology, and) the sentence A 1 ∧ A 2 → ¬Y 2 is a second-order tautology; see [9] . As a matter of fact, some weaker conditions than A 1 ∧ A 2 can also prove (¬Y 1 and) ¬Y 2 . For example,
suffices. To see that A is really weaker than A 1 ∧ A 2 , consider the directed graph (D; R)
with D = {a, b, c, d} where aRbRc and xRd for all x ∈ D. Then (D; R) does not satisfy A 2 , since it is not transitive (we have aRbRc but ¬aRc), while it satisfies A, since for any
Even some weaker conditions than A can prove (¬Y 1 and) ¬Y 2 . One such example is:
To see that A 0 is weaker than A, consider the directed graph (D;
where aRbRcRc; it is easy to see that A 0 is satisfied in this directed graph while A is not. However, A 0 is not the weakest possible first-order sentence that implies the second-order sentence ¬Y 2 .
In the next section, we show that no first-order sentence in the language of R is equivalent with ¬Y 2 . So, neither the sentence Y 2 nor its negation ¬Y 2 is first-orderizable (see [2, 3] ). Not only the second-order sentence ¬Y 2 is non-equivalent with any first-order sentence, but also it is non-equivalent with any first-order theory (which could contain infinitely many sentences).
Actually, Y 2 is equivalent to the existence of a kernel in a directed graph D; R ; see e.g. [1] . So, our result shows that the existence or non-existence of a kernel in a directed graph is not equivalent to any first-order sentence (in the language of ordered graphs).
Whence, Yablo's paradox, formalized as (¬Y 1 or as) ¬Y 2 in Definition 1.1, does not turn by itself into a first-order or a second-order tautology, and some conditions should be put on R to make it a theorem. This paradox can be nicely translated into some theorems in Linear Temporal Logic (see [7, 8] ) or in Modal Logic (see [6] ). Proof: :
The second equivalence is straightforward; so, we prove the first equivalence only. (2): Second, suppose that the directed graph M ; R associated to M ; s has a kernel K, and also (for the sake of a contradiction) that M ; s has an odd cycle such as {a, s(a), s 2 (a), · · · , s 2m+1 (a) = a}, for some m > 0. Then, if a ∈ K, then s(a) ∈ K, then · · · s 2m (a) ∈ K, and so a = s 2m+1 (a) ∈ K, a contradiction. Also, if a ∈ K, then s(a) ∈ K, then · · · s 2m (a) ∈ K, and so a = s 2m+1 (a) ∈ K, a contradiction again. Therefore, if M ; R has a kernel, then M ; s can have no odd cycle. ❑ THEOREM 2.3 (Non-First-Order-izability of Y 2 and ¬Y 2 ) The second-order sentence Y 2 is not equivalent with any first-order sentence.
Proof: :
If there were a first-order sentence in the language R equivalent to Y 2 , then by Lemma 2.2 the theory S ′ = S ∪ {¬∃x(s 2n+1 (x) = x) | n ∈ N} would have been finitely axiomatizable. But this is not the case, since for any finite subset of this theory, there exists a structure that satisfies that finite sub-theory but is not a model of the whole theory S ′ : it suffices to take a sufficiently large odd cycle. ❑ Thus, there can exist no single first-order sentence η such that the second-order sentence η ↔ ¬Y 2 is a logical tautology. As a result, the proposed formalization ¬Y 2 of Yablo's paradox in Definition 1.1, being second-order in nature, is not (equivalent with any) first-order (sentence). We end the paper with a stronger result: there cannot exist any first-order theory that is equivalent with ¬Y 2 . So, Yablo's paradox is not even infinitely first-order (i.e., it is non-equivalent even with any infinite set of first-order sentences). Proof: : Suppose on the contrary that the sentence ¬Y 2 is equivalent with the first-order theory T in the language R . Consider the theory T ′ = T ∪ {¬∃x[x = s 2n+1 (x)] | n ∈ N}. Any finite sub-theory of T ′ is satisfiable (consistent), since any sufficiently large odd cycle satisfies (the sentence ¬Y 2 and) that finite sub-theory. So, T ′ is consistent, but this is a contradiction, since, by Lemma 2.2, any model of T ′ should have no odd cycles at all, and so should satisfy Y 2 . Thus, T cannot be equivalent with ¬Y 2 . ❑ One could feel the taste of Yablo's paradox in the second part of the proof of Lemma 2.2. We conjecture that the second-order sentence Y 2 too is non-equivalent with all the first-order theories. This does not concern the main topic of this article, since the sentence Y 2 does not express Yablo's paradox, and ¬Y 2 does genuinely express it (in second-order logic). We saw that to turn Yablo's paradox (formalized as ¬Y 2 ) into a proof, some conditions should be put on R, and there is no minimal first-order theory for that (i.e., to axiomatize ¬Y 2 in the first-order logic).
